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Goldstein: Civic Duty in a Pluralistic Society

JUSTICE BRANDEIS AND CIVIC DUTY IN A PLURALISTIC
SOCIETY
By Joel K. Goldstein*
I.

INTRODUCTION

History remembers Justice Louis D. Brandeis as a champion
of individual rights. Max Lerner, for instance, associated Brandeis
with a “deeply felt individualism.”1 Alpheus Mason, who authored
the first significant Brandeis biography titled Brandeis: A Free Man’s
Life, concluded that, for Justice Brandeis, “[i]ndividual worth
remained his favorite theme, human dignity his unvarying
touchstone.”2 Philippa Strum, another prominent biographer, wrote,
“individual liberty was the value [Brandeis] held highest.”3
This association of Brandeis and rights is certainly not a
misperception. Few Americans have done more than Brandeis to
articulate and establish widely cherished liberties. The iconic
Harvard Law Review article Brandeis co-authored in 18904 and his
dissent in Olmstead v. United States5 established him as a creator of
both common law and constitutional rights to privacy, the growth and
influence of which have surely exceeded his expectations. And his
eloquent concurrence in Whitney v. California6 remains the classic
judicial exposition of the freedom of speech and assembly. These
*Vincent C. Immel Professor of Law, Saint Louis University School of Law. I am grateful
to Charles A. Miller for helpful comments on this article, to Jordan Buchheit for his able
research assistance, and to Stephanie Haley for administrative help. Many thanks, too, to
Samuel Levine for the invitation to participate in the Brandeis symposium at Touro Law
School and to the other participants for such a rich and rewarding conference.
1 Max Lerner, The Social Thought of Justice Brandeis, in MR. JUSTICE BRANDEIS 9, 12
(Felix Frankfurter ed., 1932).
2 ALPHEUS T. MASON, BRANDEIS: A FREE MAN’S LIFE 644 (1946).
3 PHILIPPA STRUM, LOUIS D. BRANDEIS: JUSTICE FOR THE PEOPLE, x (1984).
4 Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193
(1890).
5 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
6 274 U.S. 357 (1927).
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writings retain their instructive power, in judicial opinions and
teaching materials. They would have secured his legacy as a
contributor to the development of individual rights if he had written
nothing else on these subjects. But he did.
Yet the common focus on Brandeis as a vindicator of rights
risks obscuring other defining aspects of his jurisprudential and
philosophical outlook, aspects which speak even more urgently to the
challenges America now faces a century after he joined the Court.
Brandeis’ discussion of rights coexisted with his commitment to a
demanding concept of civic duty. He believed that living in civil
society imposed obligations on citizens that went well beyond the
basic duties to obey the law, pay taxes and vote. He thought
engagement an obligation of citizenship and knowledge an
obligation, and a likely consequence, of engagement. In contexts
where modern liberals and conservatives celebrate various rights,
Brandeis was likely to emphasize duties as well. Rather than simply
assuming the perspective of the individual and asking what
government owed him or her, Brandeis also adopted society’s
vantage point and considered what the individual owed the
community.
Brandeis’ conception of duty (and rights) coincided with and
was linked to his recognition that America was a pluralistic
community, and to his commitment to the ideal that America should
be open to, respectful of, and welcoming of, diverse people. The fact
and value of pluralism may have made his acknowledgement of
rights more important but it also compelled a robust conception of
civic duty. Brandeis saw communal engagement as a vehicle for
individuals to broaden their knowledge and experience that, in turn,
would better lead them to accept and appreciate others, minimize
discord, and act as an instrument for individual and societal growth.
Brandeis’ commitment to a demanding ideal of civic duty in
a pluralistic community was evident in his words, on and off the
Court, and his call was made credible by its consistency and by its fit
with the behavior of a lifetime. Brandeis’ sense of duty in a
pluralistic context was apparent in multiple facets of his life including
his sense of professional responsibility as a lawyer, his activity as a
public citizen, his engagement as a Zionist leader, and, ultimately, his
work as a Supreme Court justice. This essay shows how Brandeis’
commitment to civic duty in a pluralistic society appeared in these
four areas.
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A.

In Law Practice

Brandeis’ conception of civic duty related to his sense of
professional responsibility. In 1905, he converted an invitation to
speak to students at Harvard Law School about the “Ethics of the
Legal Profession” into an occasion to expound on a lawyer’s duty to
serve the public.7 He began by attributing to his listeners a
predisposition for service. “[F]eeling the generous impulse for
service which the University fosters, you wish to know whether the
legal profession would afford you special opportunities for usefulness
to your fellow-men, and, if so, what the obligations and limitations
are which it imposes.”8 After Brandeis imputed to the Harvard Law
students of 1905 a desire to be men for others, he proceeded to
reassure them that the legal profession offered “unusual opportunities
for usefulness” in part because a lawyer’s “training” prepared him
for “the questions which are presented in a democracy.”9
Brandeis criticized lawyers for promoting business interests
rather than the public good. They had failed to advance “constructive
legislation” necessary to vindicate the public interest regarding great
societal problems and had failed to oppose proposals motivated by
“selfish interests.”10 In fact, lawyers had often erred by advocating
“as lawyers, legislative measures which as citizens they could not
approve” and justifying their behavior by a “false analogy” to their
role in litigation.11 Instead, lawyers should only support meritorious
legislation.12 They had both an opportunity and a duty to participate
in public affairs. Future lawyers would find in their chosen
profession “an opportunity for usefulness which is probably
unequalled” since the legal profession was called “to do a great work
for this country.”13
As a lawyer, Brandeis practiced what he preached. His sense
of duty was evident in his professional activities before his
7
8
9
10
11
12

LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, Opportunity in the Law, in BUSINESS—A PROFESSION, 329 (1933).
Id.
Id. at 330-31.
Id. at 339.
Id.
BRANDEIS, Opportunity in the Law, in BUSINESS—A PROFESSION, supra note 7, at 339-

41.
13

Id. at 343.

Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2017

3

Touro Law Review, Vol. 33, No. 1 [2017], Art. 7

108

TOURO LAW REVIEW

Vol. 33

appointment to the Court when, in the words of Alexander Bickel, he
“engaged in the private practice of the public profession of the
law.”14 From at least the time he was in his mid-thirties until he
joined the Court a quarter-century later, Brandeis devoted an
extraordinary amount of time to public interest legal work. 15 When
Clarence Darrow, counsel to the United Mine Workers, asked
Brandeis what his fee would be for the substantial work involved in
representing Pennsylvania coal miners before a commission
investigating their wage dispute, Brandeis replied that other than
reimbursement of his expenses, his compensation would consist
entirely of the “satisfaction of having aided a good cause.”16
Brandeis repeatedly refused to bill a wealthy client for legal work he
thought was in the public interest, telling him that he intended to
spend 50 percent of his time in public service.17 He often reimbursed
his partners for his time spent in pro bono matters to minimize the
extent to which they subsidized his public-minded work.18 Although
his early efforts centered on Boston and New England, during the
decade before his appointment to the Court he was increasingly
involved, often simultaneously, in demanding efforts that brought
him national, even international attention. In 1902, a massive coal
strike in Pennsylvania brought Brandeis into a major national
controversy involving labor unions.19 In November 1907, the
National Consumers’ League engaged him to defend Oregon’s
maximum hours statute for women employees.20 Brandeis marshaled
an abundance of data which consumed all but a few pages of his 113page brief in Muller v. Oregon,21 to demonstrate that the Oregon
statute fit within a loophole left open by Lochner v. New York22
because the restriction on freedom of contract was a means to protect
the health and safety of women workers.23 The fact-laden “Brandeis
14 ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE UNPUBLISHED OPINIONS OF MR. JUSTICE BRANDEIS: THE
SUPREME COURT AT WORK v (1957).
15 See generally David W. Levy, Brandeis, The Reformer, 45 BRANDEIS L.J. 711 (2007).
16 Quoted in MELVIN I. UROFSKY, BRANDEIS: A LIFE 231 (2009).
17 Melvin I. Urofsky, Louis D. Brandeis: Teacher, 45 BRANDEIS L.J. 733, 738 (2007).
18 UROFSKY, BRANDEIS: A LIFE, supra note 16, at 354.
19 UROFSKY, BRANDEIS: A LIFE, supra note 16, at 230-33.
20 MASON, supra note 2, at 248-52.
21 208 U.S. 412 (1908).
22 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
23 The Brandeis Brief—in its Entirety, LOUIS D. BRANDEIS SCHOOL OF LAW LIBRARY,
https://louisville.edu/law/library/special-collections/the-louis-d.-brandeis-collection/thebrandeis-brief-in-its-entirety (last visited Nov. 17, 2016).
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Brief” not only produced a unanimous decision upholding the statute,
but also created a new legal instrument that civil rights attorneys later
imitated. In 1910, his representation of Collier’s Magazine before a
Congressional committee in connection with the Pinchot-Ballinger
conservation dispute also attracted national attention.24 Ultimately,
Brandeis’ painstaking legal work produced revelations that impugned
the integrity and conduct of President William Howard Taft and led
to the resignation of Secretary of the Interior Richard Ballinger.25
That summer, shortly after the previous assignment was completed,
Brandeis became involved in the New York garment workers’
strike.26 By 1910, Brandeis’ public interest involvements made him
“a household name.”27
Brandeis’ legal training predisposed him to an inclusive
outlook and he connected law and lawyers to pluralism. Brandeis
stated that law practice “tends to make the lawyer judicial in attitude
and extremely tolerant.”28 The legal profession was premised on the
belief that a dispute could not “be properly decided until both sides
are heard.”29 Experience taught a lawyer “that nearly every question
has two sides . . . .”30
Brandeis worried that the limited exposure of many lawyers
to other communities would minimize understanding. In 1905, he
warned an audience of Harvard law students that the lack of contact
many of them had with working men left them ignorant of the
working man’s thinking.31
The prior year, Brandeis had displayed a commitment to
industrial pluralism in a remarkable speech to his clients at the annual
banquet of the Boston Typothetae. Annual banquets are, of course,
occasions for celebration and self-congratulation, this one particularly
so because the printers had just prevailed in an industrial struggle
with the printers union, in part owing to Brandeis’ work as their
counsel. In his address, Brandeis briefly reviewed the facts of the

24

See MASON, supra note 2, at 254-82.
See UROFSKY, BRANDEIS: A LIFE, supra note 16, at 254-74.
26 UROFSKY, BRANDEIS: A LIFE, supra note 16, at 243-53.
27 LEWIS J. PAPER, BRANDEIS 161 (1983).
28 BRANDEIS, Opportunity in the Law, in BUSINESS—A PROFESSION, supra note 7, at 333.
29 BRANDEIS, Opportunity in the Law, in BUSINESS—A PROFESSION, supra note 7, at 333.
30 BRANDEIS, Opportunity in the Law, in BUSINESS—A PROFESSION, supra note 7, at 333.
31 BRANDEIS, Opportunity in the Law, in BUSINESS—A PROFESSION, supra note 7, at 329
n.1, 342.
25
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dispute and congratulated his clients on their victory.32 He then
proceeded to devote most of his remarks to explaining why industrial
democracy was necessary for the well-being of their businesses, why
they should recognize and respect unions and negotiate with union
leaders, and how they should go about it.33 When a controversy
developed, Brandeis instructed his employer-clients that
“[e]mployers and employees should try to agree.”34 Rather than
persist in the common entrepreneurial response that the business
owner was entitled to dictate its own conduct, Brandeis, who
President Franklin D. Roosevelt later aptly nicknamed Isaiah,
implored his clients to adopt the “spirit” of “[c]ome, let us reason
together.”35 Employers should view their employees as partners.36
Brandeis believed that industrial dialogue could avoid or resolve
most disputes. He said:
Nine-tenths of the serious controversies which
arise in life result from misunderstanding, result from
one man not knowing the facts which to the other man
seem important, or otherwise failing to appreciate his
point of view. A properly conducted conference
involves a frank disclosure of such facts—patient,
careful argument, willingness to listen and to consider.
37

Owners and “the real managers” should participate in these
conferences, time-consuming though they are, to maximize the
chances of resolution.38 While employers should resist illegal or
immoral demands, they should approach labor based on “the eternal

32 BRANDEIS, The
7, at 13-15.
33 BRANDEIS, The
7, at 15-21.
34 BRANDEIS, The
7, at 21.
35 BRANDEIS, The
7, at 22.
36 BRANDEIS, The
7, at 22.
37 BRANDEIS, The
7, at 21.
38 BRANDEIS, The
7, at 22-23.

Employer and Trade Unions, in BUSINESS—A PROFESSION, supra note
Employer and Trade Unions, in BUSINESS—A PROFESSION, supra note
Employer and Trade Unions, in BUSINESS—A PROFESSION, supra note
Employer and Trade Unions, in BUSINESS—A PROFESSION, supra note
Employer and Trade Unions, in BUSINESS—A PROFESSION, supra note
Employer and Trade Unions, in BUSINESS—A PROFESSION, supra note
Employer and Trade Unions, in BUSINESS—A PROFESSION, supra note
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principles of Liberty, Fraternity, Justice, [and] Honor.”39 Brandeis’
belief in the efficacy of reasoned discourse in the industrial setting
foreshadowed his approach a quarter century later when, as a justice,
he considered free speech rights of dissidents and encouraged
majorities to go to lengths to engage adversaries rather than silence
them.40
Shortly before his nomination to the Court, Brandeis lamented
specialization in legal practice because it narrowed the exposure of
most lawyers to a diversified clientele.41 Moreover, and perhaps
more importantly, in the past most able lawyers participated in civic
affairs but now their practices discouraged such activity “and thus the
broadening of view which comes from political life was lost.”42
B.

As a Public Citizen

Brandeis’ conception of civic duty was even more evident in
his conduct as a public citizen and his discussions about citizenship.
As a close friend of leading progressive Senator Robert La Follette,
he helped draft, and testified for several days before congressional
committees in favor of, legislation to amend the Sherman Act to
mitigate some of the consequences from the Supreme Court’s
decision43 in Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v. United States44 and
actively supported La Follette’s candidacy for the Republican
presidential nomination in 1912.45 Following Woodrow Wilson’s
nomination as the Democratic presidential candidate that year,
Brandeis became an important adviser to him, financial supporter,
and surrogate who spoke around the country on his behalf.46
Although Brandeis was passed over for Wilson’s cabinet, he
remained a close adviser to Wilson on banking regulation, antitrust,
and other matters.47
BRANDEIS, The Employer and Trade Unions, in BUSINESS—A PROFESSION, supra note
7, at 24, 26-27.
40 See, e.g., Gilbert v. Minnesota, 254 U.S. 325, 334, 336-39, 343 (1920) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting); Whitney, 274 U.S. at 372, 375-78 (Brandeis, J., concurring).
41 BRANDEIS, The Living Law, in BUSINESS—A PROFESSION, supra note 7, at 360.
42 BRANDEIS, The Living Law, in BUSINESS—A PROFESSION, supra note 7, at 360-61.
43 PAPER, supra note 27, at 168-72.
44 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
45 PAPER, supra note 27, at 172-74.
46 UROFSKY, BRANDEIS: A LIFE, supra note 16, at 343-52.
47 UROFSKY, BRANDEIS: A LIFE, supra note 16, at 380-97.
39
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Paul A. Freund, Brandeis’ former law clerk, wrote that to
Brandeis “[t]he opportunity to serve was also an obligation.”48 When
Brandeis’ former law clerks suggested a gathering to honor his 80th
birthday, he asked that instead each write to him regarding the public
service they were performing.49 They did a lot.50 Brandeis did not
think past performance or current exigencies discharged someone
from a continuing duty of public service. His demanding creed
perhaps explained his reaction when a friend suggested that Al Smith,
the former governor of New York and 1928 Democratic presidential
candidate, might be excused from further public service due to
financial hardships, age, illness, and lengthy prior service, unless one
believed a man had an eternal duty to his community. Brandeis
focused on the last thought and replied, “Isn’t that the answer?”51 For
Brandeis it was. He joined the Court in his 60th year and continued to
discharge the Court’s work for nearly 23 years, retiring only after his
health began to slip and about two-and-one-half years before his
death.52 Even so, he continued his involvement with Zionism and his
engagement in public affairs until his death.53
Brandeis certainly thought that those to whom the most had
been given had the greatest obligation to serve,54 but his ambitious
vision of citizenship included a much more democratic view of public
service. His conception of duty was not confined, as Justice William
O. Douglas implied, to “those whose training and competence

48

PAUL A. FREUND, ON LAW AND JUSTICE 131 (1968).
Paul A. Freund, Mr. Justice Brandeis, 55 HARV. L. REV. 195, 195 (1941).
50 Brandeis’ law clerks included
Secretary of State Dean Acheson; Judge Calvert
Magruder of the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit; Judge Henry Friendly
of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit; James M. Landis, former Dean
of Harvard Law School and Chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission; William
G. Claytor, Jr., Secretary of the Navy and Deputy Secretary of Defense; Harry Shulman, a
professor and dean at Yale Law School; and Paul A. Freund, a professor at Harvard Law
School who served two stints in the office of the Solicitor General).
51 FREUND, ON LAW AND JUSTICE, supra note 48, at 131-32.
52 UROFSKY, BRANDEIS: A LIFE, supra note 16, at 436, 458, 748-49, 752-53.
53 UROFSKY, BRANDEIS: A LIFE, supra note 16, at 751.
54 Louis D. Brandeis, Address before New Century Club on the Occasion of the 250 th
Anniversary of the Settlement of the Jews in the United States: What Loyalty Demands
(Nov. 28, 1905) (transcript available in the Louis D. Brandeis School of Law Library)
[hereinafter Louis D. Brandeis, What Loyalty Demands] (“Of him who has most in ability
and intelligence, most is required, as the rich should contribute most in money to the expense
of government. Few have the privilege or the burden of serving the State in an elective or an
appointive office[.]”).
49
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permitted to assume an active civic role.”55 Rather, Brandeis thought
of political participation as an obligation of citizenship more
generally. In 1904 he proclaimed that the people could only govern
“by taking the trouble to inform themselves as to the facts necessary
for a correct decision, and then by recording that decision through a
public vote.”56 He scoffed at those who criticized politicians but
refused to participate because “politicians, even if their motives are
not of the purest, come much nearer performing their duties as
citizens than the so-called ‘good’ citizens who stay at home.”57
The following year, Brandeis argued that “active participation
in government” was a test of a citizen’s loyalty.58 Although all could
not hold public office, citizens had both “the right and the obligation
to vote.”59 Voters were part of government and were “our country’s
rulers.”60 Voting was “essential to the welfare of the State” but
because it imposed duties that “are difficult and exacting” was “not
simple.”61 And just performing the not-so-simple act of voting, a
duty 40 percent neglected, was not alone sufficient. Men had to vote
“right.”62 To do so required voters to seek “accurate information”
and make appropriate judgments “about men and measures.”63
Brandeis thought it an abuse for a citizen to vote based on personal
self-interest rather than on the public good. Above all, voters “should
recognize the seriousness of this office of citizen, the seriousness of
55 Hon. William O. Douglas, The Lasting Influence of Mr. Justice Brandeis, 19 TEMPLE
L.Q. 361, 361 (1946).
56 Louis D. Brandeis, Speech Before the Public School Association (Dec. 2, 1904)
(transcript available in the Louis D. Brandeis School of Law Library) [hereinafter Louis D.
Brandeis, Speech Before the Public School Association].
57 Id.
58 Louis D. Brandeis, What Loyalty Demands, supra note 54. See also Strum, Brandeis:
The Public Activist and Freedom of Speech, 45 BRANDEIS L.J. 659, 704 (2007) (stating that
Brandeis expected citizens “above all, to participate actively in their democracy.”);
UROFSKY, BRANDEIS: A LIFE, supra note 16, at 747 (“The highest honor in a democracy is to
be a citizen, but it carries the responsibility to participate in the governing process.”);
Douglas, supra note 55, at 361 (stating that “Brandeis had a deep conviction that citizenship
in a democracy carried responsibilities more extensive than the conventional duty to vote
and to pay taxes. He perceived that it was not only necessary for those who exercised the
franchise to have an intelligent grasp of the issues of government. He was convinced that it
was the bounden duty of those whose training and competence permitted to assume an active
civic role in getting at the heart of the issues and in carrying those issues to the public.”).
59 Louis D. Brandeis, What Loyalty Demands, supra note 54.
60 Louis D. Brandeis, What Loyalty Demands, supra note 54.
61 Louis D. Brandeis, What Loyalty Demands, supra note 54.
62 Louis D. Brandeis, What Loyalty Demands, supra note 54.
63 Louis D. Brandeis, What Loyalty Demands, supra note 54.
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the vote which is its expression” and must treat it “as a sacred trust to
be exercised for the common good, and that he who selfishly omits to
cast it, as he who casts it selfishly – is disloyal.”64 Democracy,
Brandeis wrote in a letter in 1922, “is a serious undertaking. . . . It
demands continuous sacrifice by the individual and more exigent
obedience to the moral law than any other form of government.”65
As Jeffrey Rosen rightly points out, Brandeis rejected the idea of
some progressives that experts could govern the people with little
intrusion on the time of non-elites. On the contrary, Brandeis
“believed passionately that citizens have a duty to educate themselves
so that they are capable of self-government, both personal and
political, and of defending their liberties against overreaching
corporate and federal power.”66
Brandeis conceived “every voter [a]s a part ruler of the
state.”67 Democracy depended on an educated and engaged citizenry.
The state, therefore, was obliged to provide citizens with facilities for
development, the opportunity for their use, and must stimulate the
desire to use those facilities.68 That imposed a requirement to
consider the well-being of others. In a democracy, Brandeis
concluded, citizens were “necessarily our brothers’ keepers.”69 In
order to discharge their function as citizens, individuals must have an
appropriate income, reasonable working hours, education,
independence, and leisure.70 Society must make sure that these
conditions existed so that all could function as democratic citizens.71
Leisure was a critical resource for democratic citizens but, to
Brandeis, leisure was certainly not “idleness”72 or reading a thriller at

64

Louis D. Brandeis, What Loyalty Demands, supra note 54; see also UROFSKY,
BRANDEIS: A LIFE, supra note 16, at 401 (discussing Brandeis’ belief that the office of citizen
was the highest office in a democracy and required considerable effort to fulfill its
responsibilities).
65 Letter from Louis D. Brandeis to Robert W. Bruere (Feb. 25, 1922), in V LETTERS OF
LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, 1921-1941: ELDER STATESMAN, 45, 46 (Melvin I. Urofsky & David W.
Levy eds., 1978) [hereinafter V LETTERS].
66 JEFFREY ROSEN, LOUIS D. BRANDEIS: AMERICAN PROPHET 17 (2016).
67 LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, True Americanism, in BRANDEIS ON ZIONISM: A COLLECTION OF
ADDRESSES AND STATEMENTS BY LOUIS D. BRANDEIS 3, 5 (1942) [hereinafter True
Americanism, in BRANDEIS ON ZIONISM].
68 BRANDEIS, True Americanism, in BRANDEIS ON ZIONISM, supra note 67, at 5.
69 BRANDEIS, True Americanism, in BRANDEIS ON ZIONISM, supra note 67, at 5.
70 BRANDEIS, True Americanism, in BRANDEIS ON ZIONISM, supra note 67, at 6-7.
71 BRANDEIS, True Americanism, in BRANDEIS ON ZIONISM, supra note 67, at 6-7.
72 BRANDEIS, True Americanism, in BRANDEIS ON ZIONISM, supra note 67, at 6-7.
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the beach. After all, Brandeis found relaxation by reading a favorite
book, Alfred Zimmern’s Greek Commonwealth, repeatedly for
pleasure even when he was immersed in stressful litigation.73 Rather,
leisure, he said, “means ability to work not less but more, ability to
work at something besides breadwinning, ability to work harder
while working at breadwinning, and ability to work more years at
breadwinning.”74 Leisure would allow citizens to develop the
knowledge that was a prerequisite for skillful civic participation and
afford them the opportunity to so engage.75 Democracy depended on
such leisure.76
Brandeis supported women’s suffrage not simply as a right
but as a duty. He recognized and as a good advocate made, both
arguments for granting women the vote. He concluded, “[t]hat
women should enjoy this right and perform this duty is essential to
the success of democracy.”77 But ultimately he thought the more
compelling justification for women’s suffrage was the “need of the
state.”78 Women could only fully develop “through the assumption
of broad responsibilities.”79 They needed the vote primarily so they
could give to, not get from, society. Moreover, since each group
could best protect its own interests, democracy was at risk when any
failed to participate.80
Women, thought this father of two
professional women, could best protect themselves as democratic
participants.
Brandeis also believed that the society in which a citizen was
obligated to participate was and should be pluralistic. A year before
joining the Court, Brandeis became the first Jewish American invited
to deliver the Independence Day address at Boston’s Faneuil Hall.81
In the speech, Brandeis reaffirmed his belief that pluralism was both
a constitutional principle and a source of strength. Modern men
shared the founders’ belief “that in America, under a free
73

UROFSKY, BRANDEIS: A LIFE, supra note 16, at 295-97, 359.
BRANDEIS, True Americanism, in BRANDEIS ON ZIONISM, supra note 67, at 6-7.
75 BRANDEIS, True Americanism, in BRANDEIS ON ZIONISM, supra note 67, at 6-7.
76 BRANDEIS, True Americanism, in BRANDEIS ON ZIONISM, supra note 67, at 6-7.
77 Louis D. Brandeis, Speech on Suffrage at the Tremont Temple (Oct. 12, 1915)
(transcript available in the Louis D. Brandeis School of Law Library) [hereinafter Louis D.
Brandeis, Speech on Suffrage].
78 Id.
79 Id.
80 Id.
81 UROFSKY, BRANDEIS: A LIFE, supra note 16, at 413.
74
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government, many peoples would make one nation.”82 America had
welcomed to citizenship immigrants from many countries in the
belief that such a policy could “best serve ourselves and mankind.
This faith has been justified.”83
Although Brandeis thought other nations could match
America’s commitment to individual autonomy and liberty, he
recalled that one “peculiarly American” feature is “inclusive
brotherhood.”84 Brandeis imagined the democratic state as an
“inclusive brotherhood,” which rested on the twin “pillars” that all
were equally entitled to liberty and that “equal opportunity will most
advance civilization.”85
Moreover, Brandeis thought America had and should
welcome immigrants from different lands and celebrate their
diversity, not insist on conformity.
America has believed that each race had something of
peculiar value which it can contribute to the
attainment of those high ideals for which it is striving.
America has believed that we must not only give to
the immigrant the best that we have, but must preserve
for America the good that is in the immigrant and
develop in him the best of which he is capable.
America has believed that in differentiation, not in
uniformity, lies the path of progress.86
Far from seeking to extinguish national differences, Brandeis
believed they provided strength. America believed that every people,
“has the right and duty to develop, and that only through such
differentiated development will high civilization be attained.”87 In
Brandeis’ formulation, individuals and the racial and ethnic groups
with which they identified had a duty as well as a right “to develop”
and that “differentiated development” constituted a public good.
Brandeis believed that prejudice remained in liberal society
because of the failure to grant “the equality of whole peoples or

82
83
84
85
86
87

BRANDEIS, True Americanism, in BRANDEIS ON ZIONISM, supra note 67, at 3.
BRANDEIS, True Americanism, in BRANDEIS ON ZIONISM, supra note 67, at 3.
BRANDEIS, True Americanism, in BRANDEIS ON ZIONISM, supra note 67, at 8.
BRANDEIS, True Americanism, in BRANDEIS ON ZIONISM, supra note 67, at 8-9.
BRANDEIS, True Americanism, in BRANDEIS ON ZIONISM, supra note 67, at 10.
BRANDEIS, True Americanism, in BRANDEIS ON ZIONISM, supra note 67, at 11.
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nationalities” as well as of individuals.88 Democracy was predicated
on the belief that “the full development of each individual is not only
a right, but a duty to society; and that our best hope for civilization
lies not in uniformity, but in wide differentiation.”89 Inclusion was a
right but it implied a duty to participate to fully develop and
accordingly redeem society’s faith and investment in each individual.
C.

The Influence of Brandeis’ Zionism on His Views

These ideas were consistent with, and probably traced in part
to, Brandeis’ involvement in the Zionist movement, a commitment
which allowed him to develop his views about civic duty and its
relationship to pluralistic society. In his activities as a Zionist leader,
Brandeis was committed to mobilizing American Jews to accept a
communal responsibility to support the quest for a national homeland
that would provide a refuge from anti-Semitism in Europe and
elsewhere. Yet he also had to address the suggestions that support
for Zionism was inconsistent with loyalty to America.
Brandeis made occasional speeches in support of the Zionist
movement in the early months of the Wilson administration before
becoming its American leader in August 1914 after World War I
began. These reflected a duty Jews had to advance Jewish communal
interests. For instance, in May of 1913 Brandeis told a Young Men’s
Hebrew Association meeting in Chelsea, Massachusetts, of his
conversation with the great Zionist, Aaron Aaronsohn, who had
attributed the lack of crime among Jews in Palestine to their sense of
mutual communal responsibility.90
This anecdote confirmed
Brandeis’ belief that a sense of duty encouraged good citizenship in
multiple ways.91 He told his audience that they must each feel
themselves “the trustee of what is best in Jewish History” and let the
example of the “pioneers in Palestine . . . radiate” their lives and
commit to support their efforts.92 Indeed, he assumed leadership of
the American Zionist movement because he deemed it his “duty” to
88 BRANDEIS, The Jewish Problem, How to Solve It, in BRANDEIS ON ZIONISM, supra note
67, at 17.
89 BRANDEIS, The Jewish Problem, How to Solve It, in BRANDEIS ON ZIONISM, supra note
67, at 19.
90 BRANDEIS, To Be a Jew, in BRANDEIS ON ZIONISM, supra note 67, at 39, 40-41
[hereinafter To Be a Jew, in BRANDEIS ON ZIONISM].
91 BRANDEIS, To Be a Jew, in BRANDEIS ON ZIONISM, supra note 67, at 40-41.
92 BRANDEIS, To Be a Jew, in BRANDEIS ON ZIONISM, supra note 67, at 41.
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help and thought there was a collective “duty” to save the Jewish
people.93
Brandeis’ call for American Jews to actively support the
Zionist movement ran counter to suggestions, in some Jewish and
non-Jewish circles, of dual loyalty. Brandeis confronted the issue
and repudiated the premise that Jews could not be both loyal
Americans and Zionists. He associated American “ideals of
democracy and of social justice” with venerable Jewish teachings .94
He insisted, “loyalty to America demands rather that each American
Jew become a Zionist. For only through the ennobling effect of its
strivings can we develop the best that is in us and give to this country
the full benefit of our great inheritance.”95 Brandeis insisted that
American Jews had a duty to lead the Zionist movement and that that
effort would allow them to develop their own skills, which they could
contribute to America.
Brandeis called on every adult Jew, women and men to join
the Zionist organization.96 Women would have equal rights but
“[e]qual rights spell equal obligations.”97 In Chicago on January 2,
1916, Brandeis told the Knights of Zion that their “duty as Jews”
required them to elevate the Jewish people so it could “best serve
America and the world.” And he concluded, “Let no one of you, if
he be a true American, shirk his duty.”98 In July, 1916, one month
after joining the Court, Brandeis associated Zionism with democracy
and said that “[d]emocracy means not merely, . . . the rights of the
whole people, as the duties of the whole people.”99 Jews had not
simply “a right to be heard” but “he has also a duty to be heard.”100
Every Zionist had a duty to read at least one Zionist newspaper daily,

93 BRANDEIS, The Jewish People Should Be Preserved, in BRANDEIS ON ZIONISM, supra
note 67, at 43-44; see also BRANDEIS, Strain Every Nerve, in BRANDEIS ON ZIONISM, supra
note 67, at 46-48.
94 Louis D. Brandeis, A Call to the Educated Jew, 1 MENORAH J. 13, 15 (1915).
95 BRANDEIS, The Jewish Problem, in BRANDEIS ON ZIONISM, supra note 67, at 29; see
also BRANDEIS, The Fruits of Zionism, in BRANDEIS ON ZIONISM, supra note 67, at 49-50.
96 BRANDEIS, Every Jew a Zionist, in BRANDEIS ON ZIONISM, supra note 67, at 76, 77
[hereinafter Every Jew a Zionist, in BRANDEIS ON ZIONISM].
97 BRANDEIS, Every Jew a Zionist, in BRANDEIS ON ZIONISM, supra note 67, at 76, 77
98 BRANDEIS, Not by Charity Alone, in BRANDEIS ON ZIONISM, supra note 67, at 84, 88.
99 BRANDEIS, Democracy Means Responsibility, in BRANDEIS ON ZIONISM, supra note 67,
at 91 [hereinafter Democracy Means Responsibility, in BRANDEIS ON ZIONISM].
100 BRANDEIS, Democracy Means Responsibility, in BRANDEIS ON ZIONISM, supra note 67,
at 91.
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to master its facts and to communicate what he read.101 A Zionist did
not do his duty unless he joined a Zionist organization and saw that
his siblings did Zionist work.102
Brandeis expressed confidence that American Jews would
“perform fully their obligation” to support Zionism. There were
“special reasons” they should be “eager to do so” since a Jewish State
would do more for American Jews than they could do for it by
enabling American Jews “to perform our plain duty to America.” A
Jewish State would help American Jews contribute “toward the
attainment of the American ideals of democracy and social
justice.”103 Supporting Zionism was a Jewish and American
“duty.”104
In arguing for the consistency of Americanism and Jewish
experience, Brandeis also revealed his fundamental premises
regarding life in democratic society. For Jews, Brandeis argued,
democracy was not simply an abstraction but a reality due to the
existence of certain necessary conditions including “[a]n allpervading sense of duty in the citizen.”105 “Democratic ideals cannot
be attained through emphasis merely upon the rights of man,”
Brandeis wrote in 1915. “Even a recognition that every right has a
correlative duty will not meet the needs of democracy. Duty must be
accepted as the dominant conception in life.”106 After identifying
other conditions essential to democracy, namely “high intellectual
attainments” and “[s]ubmission to leadership,” rather than to
authority, Brandeis returned to the theme of duty, which rested upon
“[a] developed community sense.”107 Jews could not be described as
individualists because “to a rare degree” they had “merged” their
individuality and community interest, a condition evident in their
interest in identifying themselves with the larger community rather

101

BRANDEIS, Democracy Means Responsibility, in BRANDEIS ON ZIONISM, supra note 67,

at 92.
102

BRANDEIS, Democracy Means Responsibility, in BRANDEIS ON ZIONISM, supra note 67,

at 93.
103

BRANDEIS, The Fruits of Zionism, in BRANDEIS ON ZIONISM, supra note 88, at 54.
BRANDEIS, Dreams May Be Made Into Realities, in BRANDEIS ON ZIONISM, supra note
88, at 71, 72.
105 BRANDEIS, A Call to the Educated Jew, supra note 94, at 15.
106 BRANDEIS, A Call to the Educated Jew, supra note 94, at 15.
107 BRANDEIS, A Call to the Educated Jew, supra note 94, at 16.
104
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than focusing on an individual’s life as a prelude to a personal
afterlife.108
D.

Justice Brandeis

Once Brandeis was confirmed as a justice in June of 1916,
except for an occasional speech to Zionist organizations, he
essentially limited his public written discussions to his judicial
opinions. Unlike many modern justices, he did not write books or
law review articles about the Court or constitutional theory nor did he
sit for published interviews. Yet his judicial writings continued to
reveal the importance he gave to the ideals of civil duty and
American pluralism.
At times he went out of his way to introduce the ideal of civic
duty into contexts where it was not otherwise under discussion. For
instance, in Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering,109 Brandeis
dissented from the majority opinion holding a secondary boycott
violated federal statutory law.110 Although he concluded that the
union was within its rights, Brandeis went out of his way to recognize
community obligation as paramount to individual rights. “All rights
are derived from the purposes of the society in which they exist;
above all rights rises duty to the community,” he wrote. “The
conditions developed in industry may be such that those engaged in it
cannot continue their struggle without danger to the community.”111
Similarly, Brandeis’ commitment to duties as well as rights
was evident in discussions of rights to private property. In
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon,112 he dissented from the majority
opinion, which held a state statute unconstitutional because it
prohibited the mining of coal beneath the surface of property to
protect against subsidence.113 Brandeis rejected the suggestion that
the doctrine of reciprocity of advantage precluded government from
exercising police power to protect the public “from detriment and
danger.”114 Those the statute hurt enjoyed “the advantage of living

108
109
110
111
112
113
114

BRANDEIS, A Call to the Educated Jew, supra note 94, at 16-17.
254 U.S. 443 (1921).
Id. at 478-79.
Id. at 488 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
260 U.S. 393 (1922).
Id. at 416.
Id. at 422 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
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and doing business in a civilized community”115 thereby constituting
whatever reciprocity of advantage they were owed.116 Brandeis,
unlike his colleagues, refused to consider the owner’s rights to
private property independent of the obligations associated with the
privileges of social living.
To be sure, Brandeis’ classic opinions in Whitney v.
California and Olmstead v. United States in consecutive years in the
late 1920s, represent two of the greatest statements of individual
rights in American literature.117 Yet the former really represents a
synthesis of his views regarding civic duty in a pluralistic society and
the latter can easily be seen as related to those concerns, although the
connection is less obvious.
Brandeis’ Whitney concurrence was the culmination of years
of thought and judicial writing about free speech. In 1920 in Pierce
v. United States,118 he had written that the “fundamental right of free
men to strive for better conditions through new legislation and new
institutions” would be imperiled “if efforts to secure it by argument
to fellow citizens” was treated as criminal incitement.119 Later that
year he characterized political speech as not simply a political right
but an obligation of citizenship. He wrote:
The right of a citizen of the United States to take part,
for his own or the country’s benefit, in the making of
federal laws and in the conduct of the government,
necessarily includes the right to speak or write about
them; to endeavor to make his own opinion
concerning laws existing or contemplated prevail; and,
to this end, to teach the truth as he sees it. Were this
not so, ‘the right of the people to assemble for the
purpose of petitioning Congress for a redress of
115

Id. (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
Id. (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
117 See, e.g., UROFSKY, BRANDEIS: A LIFE, supra note 16, at 618 (“Yet if he had never
written anything other than the Olmstead and Whitney opinions, his impact on American
constitutional law would still have been great.”); Id. at 641 (referring to Brandeis’
“towering” Whitney opinion which has “informed all discussions of free speech since.”);
Vincent Blasi, The First Amendment and the Ideal of Civic Courage: The Brandeis Opinion
in Whitney v. California, 29 WM. & MARY L. REV. 653, 668 (1988) (stating that “the idealism
that permeates his Whitney opinion . . . makes it arguably the most important essay ever
written, on or off the bench, on the meaning of the first amendment.”).
118 252 U.S. 239 (1920).
119 Id. at 273 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
116
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grievance or for anything else connected with the
powers or duties of the national government’ would be
a right totally without substance. Full and free
exercise of this right by the citizen is ordinarily also
his duty; for its exercise is more important to the
nation than it is to himself. Like the course of the
heavenly bodies, harmony in national life is a resultant
of the struggle between contending forces. In frank
expression of conflicting opinion lies the greatest
promise of wisdom in governmental action; and in
suppression lies ordinarily the greatest peril.120
In essence, Brandeis conceived of the right to free speech and
assembly as essential to democracy. The “[f]ull and free exercise of
this right by the citizen is ordinarily also his duty,” Brandeis
proclaimed in the quoted passage, because “its exercise is more
important to the nation than it is to himself.” He gave two reasons
for his conclusion regarding the public importance of performance of
the duty. First, public exchange was an essential instrument of
national “harmony.” Exchange was more likely than avoidance to
produce understanding. Second, “frank expression of conflicting
opinion” was most likely to produce wise government behavior. By
contrast, suppression of speech is perilous.
Whitney involved an appeal from the conviction of Anita
Whitney for helping to organize, belonging to and associating with
the Communist Party of California, which was formed to teach
criminal syndicalism.121 Brandeis used his opinion to suggest criteria
which narrowed the “clear and present danger” test by his celebrated
declaration of the centrality of liberty.122
“To reach sound
conclusions on these matters,” Brandeis wrote, required considering
“why a state is, ordinarily, denied the power to prohibit dissemination
of social, economic and political doctrine which a vast majority of its
citizens believe to be false and fraught with evil consequence.”123 He
wrote:

120 Gilbert v. Minnesota, 254 U.S. 325, 337-38 (1920) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (citations
omitted).
121 Whitney, 274 U.S. at 359-60.
122 Id. at 374 (Brandeis, J., concurring).
123 Id. (Brandeis, J., concurring).
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Those who won our independence believed that the
final end of the state was to make men free to develop
their faculties, and that in its government the
deliberative forces should prevail over the arbitrary.
They valued liberty both as an end and as a means.
They believed liberty to be the secret of happiness and
courage to be the secret of liberty. They believed that
freedom to think as you will and to speak as you think
are means indispensable to the discovery and spread of
political truth; that without free speech and assembly
discussion would be futile; that with them, discussion
affords ordinarily adequate protection against the
dissemination of noxious doctrine; that the greatest
menace to freedom is an inert people; that public
discussion is a political duty; and that this should be a
fundamental principle of the American government.124
Brandeis’ connection of speech with the discovery of political
truth and the repression of “noxious doctrine” implied that he
regarded political participation as a duty of citizenship in a
democratic society.125 How else was a society to make certain that
“political truth” triumphed over “noxious doctrine” than through the
active engagement of its citizenry? And how else could democratic
society combat “the greatest menace to freedom[,] . . . an inert
people?” Yet Brandeis did not leave that association merely to
inference. On the contrary, he made the point explicit, writing that
“public discussion is a political duty; and that this should be a
fundamental principle of the American government.” Whereas fear
bred repression and hate, Brandeis argued that “the path of safety lies
in the opportunity to discuss freely supposed grievances and
proposed remedies; and that the fitting remedy for evil counsels is
good ones.”126 The founding generation believed “in the power of
reason as applied through public discussion” and recognized that
majorities could be tyrannical and accordingly, guaranteed free
speech and assembly as an antidote.127

124

Id. at 375 (Brandeis, J., concurring).
See Urofsky, Louis D. Brandeis: Teacher, supra note 17, at 747 (“Free speech is
necessary not just as an individual right, but as the bedrock of democratic government.”).
126 Whitney, 274 U.S. at 375 (Brandeis, J., concurring).
127 Id. at 375-76 (Brandeis, J., concurring).
125
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To be sure, Brandeis thought that speech promoted individual
development. In Whitney, Brandeis stated that “[i]t is the function of
speech to free men from the bondage of irrational fears.”128 Yet the
context of that statement makes clear that Brandeis’ concern was
collective tyranny, not individual ignorance, and the remedy was
discussion as a vehicle for social exchange not as a means of
individual discovery.
In other words, a “fundamental principle” of American
government should recognize that “public discussion is a political
duty.” People had a “duty” to discuss issues publicly because
political engagement protected freedom. It helped produce truth; it
checked majority tyranny; it protected minorities from oppression;
and it produced an engaged populace with the “personal qualities of
wisdom, creativity, and confidence” to resist noxious doctrine.129
Brandeis believed that “the fully developed human would have a
profound sense of responsibility to the community.”130
Brandeis sought to protect, indeed encourage, robust political
speech, including speech from society’s dissenters. As such,
Brandeis’ Whitney concurrence implicitly seeks to foster a pluralistic
society. Those who express orthodox thoughts are not in jeopardy of
having their voices silenced. The capacious free speech Brandeis
championed was designed to prevent oppression of minorities.
Daniel Farber wrote that Brandeis’ goal was “to produce a vibrant
and creative intellectual community, and one genuinely open to full
participation by all groups within society.”131 Brandeis believed in
“popular participation in the governmental process as the path to a
free and stable society, and public deliberation as a critical
component of that participation.”132 Inasmuch as the people were the
rulers in a democracy, they also had a duty to discharge their
responsibility.

128

Whitney, 274 U.S. at 376 (Brandeis, J., concurring).
See, e.g., Blasi, supra note 117, at 674 (“To me, his point is that noxious doctrine is
most likely to flourish when its opponents lack the personal qualities of wisdom, creativity,
and confidence.”).
130 Daniel A. Farber, Reinventing Brandeis: Legal Pragmatism for the Twenty-First
Century, 1995 U. ILL. L. REV. 163, 185 (1995).
131 Id. at 190.
132 Ashutosh A. Bhagwat, The Story of Whitney v. California: The Power of Ideas, in
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW STORIES 383, 403 (Michael C. Dorf ed., 2d. ed. 2009) [hereinafter
Bhagwat, The Story of Whitney v. California, in CONSTITUTIONAL LAW STORIES].
129
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Brandeis envisioned an interactive society. He thought
participation and exchange would make majorities more pluralistic.
“Men feared witches and burnt women,” he wrote in one of the most
memorable passages.133 Brandeis’ remedy of public discussion rests
on the faith that reason and interaction would have saved such a
community from such a blunder. In some instances, exchange would
have produced converts in the direction reason led. It at least would
have promoted mutual understanding. Interaction would have led the
witch-fearing men to recognize their misperception before they acted
upon it. And discussion would have increased the likelihood that
dissenters would believe the system heard their voices. An impulse
which, before his appointment to the Court, had led Brandeis to
advocate industrial democracy, now led Justice Brandeis to prescribe
interaction and exchange in political society.
Brandeis celebrated the revolutionary generation who, not
only, “did not fear political change,” as he said, but accomplished
it.134 He stated:
Those who won our independence by revolution
were not cowards. They did not fear political change.
They did not exalt order at the cost of liberty. To
courageous, self-reliant men, with confidence in the
power of free and fearless reasoning applied through
the processes of popular government, no danger
flowing from speech can be deemed clear and present,
unless the incidence of the evil apprehended is so
imminent that it may befall before there is opportunity
for full discussion.135
Diversity imposed more risk than did a homogeneous society. It
required more courage to hear one’s cherished views denounced and
more ingenuity to meet those challenges by better reasoning.
Brandeis envisioned a community of “courageous, self-reliant men,
with confidence in the power of free and fearless reasoning applied
through the processes of popular government.” He believed, as
Vincent Blasi has written, that “in a political community personal
qualities, such as hope and imagination tend to be contagious and

133
134
135

Whitney, 274 U.S. at 376. (Brandeis, J., concurring).
Whitney, 274 U.S. at 377 (Brandeis, J., concurring).
Id. (Brandeis, J., concurring).
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reciprocal.”136
Brandeis was not naïve nor did he attribute
superhuman powers to men. On the contrary, a few years after his
concurrence in Whitney he wrote that “[m]an is weak, and his
judgment is at best fallible.”137 Yet reason was the alternative to
repression, and therefore democratic society depended on creating
conditions hospitable to it. Thus, free speech was necessary to make
democracy possible.138
Democratic government existed in part to enable individuals
to fully develop their abilities so they could function effectively as
democratic citizens.139 Brandeis wrote in 1922 that “[t]he great
developer is responsibility.”140 Citizens needed to participate in “the
processes of common living” to develop their full potential.141
Brandeis, of course, was an architect of a common law and
constitutional right to privacy. The former traced to his 1890 article
in the Harvard Law Review.142 The year after Brandeis published his
concurrence in Whitney, he dissented in Olmstead from Chief Justice
Taft’s majority opinion that upheld a prosecution based on massive
wire-tapping. Brandeis invoked the right to privacy which was
implicit in the Fourth and Fifth Amendments to the Constitution.143
Brandeis wrote that:
The makers of our Constitution undertook to secure
conditions favorable to the pursuit of happiness. They
recognized the significance of man’s spiritual nature,
of his feelings, and of his intellect. They knew that
only a part of the pain, pleasure and satisfactions of
136

Blasi, supra note 117, at 676.
New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 310 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
138 Farber, supra note 130, at 183 (stating Brandeis believed that without free speech
democracy was not “viable”); see also David E. Bernstein, From Progressivism to Modern
Liberalism: Louis D. Brandeis as a Transitional Figure in Constitutional Law, 89 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 2029, 2049 (2014) (“Brandeis defended freedom of speech primarily on the
instrumental ground that it promoted free and rational public discussion, essential for the
American people to govern themselves.”); Neil M. Richards, The Puzzle of Brandeis,
Privacy, and Speech, 63 VAND. L. REV. 1295, 1323 (2010) (explaining Brandeis advocated
free speech not simply as right “but because it safeguarded the social processes of selfgovernance.”).
139 Farber, supra note 130, at 184-85.
140 Letter from Louis D. Brandeis to Robert W. Bruere, in V LETTERS, supra note 65, at
46.
141 Letter from Louis D. Brandeis to Robert W. Bruere, in V LETTERS, supra note 65, at
46.
142 Warren & Brandeis, supra note 4.
143 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 471(1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
137
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life are to be found in material things. They sought to
protect Americans in their beliefs, their thoughts, their
emotions and their sensations. They conferred, as
against the government, the right to be let alone - the
most comprehensive of rights and the right most
valued by civilized men. To protect that right, every
unjustifiable intrusion by the government upon the
privacy of the individual, whatever the means
employed, must be deemed a violation of the Fourth
Amendment.144
Brandeis’ identification with the right to privacy and “the
right to be let alone” may seem inconsistent with a commitment to
civic duty in a pluralistic society. As seminal were his Harvard Law
Review article and his Olmstead dissent, Brandeis focused on privacy
only episodically during his career,145 a fact that provides further
confirmation of how diverse and consequential his life was.
Moreover, Brandeis did not view either right—of privacy or
speech—as absolute. Although he struck the balance in favor of both
rights, his formulations made clear that he weighed them against
other values nonetheless.
The Fourth Amendment protected
individuals not against all government searches and seizures but only
against “unjustifiable intrusion;”146 rights of speech and assembly
must yield to the government’s need to protect against destruction of,
or serious injury to, the State.147 In each instance, rights, even those
given highest value, existed in a social context and must sometimes
yield to other community interests.
More importantly, Brandeis saw the “right to be let alone” as
a right individuals held against society or the government against
unjustified intrusion.148 Even though Brandeis did not believe society
144

Id. at 478 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
Richards, supra note 138, at 1311.
146 Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 478 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
147 Whitney, 274 U.S. at 373 (Brandeis, J., concurring) (“But, although the rights of free
speech and assembly are fundamental, they are not in their nature absolute. Their exercise is
subject to restriction, if the particular restriction proposed is required in order to protect the
state from destruction or from serious injury, political, economic or moral.”).
148
Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 478 (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (“The makers of our Constitution
undertook to secure conditions favorable to the pursuit of happiness. They recognized the
significance of man’s spiritual nature, of his feelings and of his intellect. They knew that
only a part of the pain, pleasure and satisfactions of life are to be found in material things.
They sought to protect Americans in their beliefs, their thoughts, their emotions and their
sensations. They conferred, as against the government, the right to be let alone—the most
145
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or the state should intrude into private spaces, by force or technology,
he certainly did not endorse reclusive life. His example and words
refute any such conclusion.
Brandeis’ belief in a right to be let alone was fully consistent
with a duty to participate in a pluralistic society. The right to be let
alone was not designed to allow individuals to “pursue lives of
private fulfillment,” but to serve the instrumental purpose of helping
them “develop their abilities and imaginations, to be applied
creatively to the needs of those around them, free from the deadening
weight of government or group pressure.”149 Whereas wiretaps in
Olmstead were a device to detect bootlegging, the same technique
could be used to eavesdrop on political conversations and become an
instrument whereby a government or majority could act to chill
political exchange. In his dissent in Gilbert v. Minnesota, Brandeis
had complained of a statute which would preclude teachings that a
citizen should not engage in war during the privacy of a family
conversation in the home.150 Technology, like statutory prohibitions,
could suppress discussion. In some respects, wiretaps, being less
conspicuous and accordingly less accountable, presented the graver
threat. As Neil Richards has written, Brandeis believed “ideas need
space to incubate and develop, and that privacy protections for
thoughts and new ideas are essential to meaningful debate and
discussion.”151
There is another aspect in which recognition of an expansive
right of privacy serves, rather than inhibits, an interactive society.
Although Brandeis did not articulate such a connection, one of his
wisest law clerks and one who best understood his thought, Paul A.
Freund, did.152 In his article, “Privacy: One Concept or Many,”
Freund suggested the “hypothesis” that privacy “serves an important
socializing function. An unwillingness to suffer disclosure of what
has been discreditable in one’s life, or of one’s most intimate
comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men. To protect that right,
every unjustifiable intrusion by the government upon the privacy of the individual, whatever
the means employed, must be deemed a violation of the Fourth Amendment.”).
149 Farber, supra note 130, at 185.
150 Gilbert, 254 U.S. at 335-36 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
151 Richards, supra note 138, at 1347.
152 See generally Paul A. Freund, Privacy: One Concept or Many, in PRIVACY (J. Roland
Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1971). I am grateful to my friend and former professor,
Charles A. Miller, who a number of years ago first pointed out to me Freund’s unique skill
as an expositor of Brandeis’ thought and work.
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thoughts and feelings, reflects an intuitive sense that to share
everything would jeopardize the sharing of anything.”153 Brandeis
may have recognized Freund’s profound insight that successful
interaction depends on mutual recognition of a private sphere.
III.

CONCLUSION

History has secured Brandeis’ reputation as a foremost and
effective champion of individual rights relating to speech, assembly,
and privacy. Yet Brandeis was a gifted contextual thinker and his
work in those pursuits occurred in a context that saw the individual
not as an isolated being but as a part of a larger society. His
commitment was to societal, as well as individual, development and
he recognized the interdependence of those aspirations. Individuals
would best develop in democratic society, and democratic society
depended on engaged and developed individuals for its sustained
health.
Brandeis insisted that individuals had duties as well as rights,
and that the effective performance of duties of citizenship was
essential to individual development and societal health. Society
could not function effectively if individuals focused only on their
own self-interest rather than on communal needs. Individuals could
not develop fully if their cause was simply themselves rather than
their community. On the other hand, engaged citizens who took their
public responsibilities seriously would not only develop but would
contribute to the functioning of democratic society.
Brandeis recognized that democratic society was necessarily
diverse. Free individuals would develop differently in any case. The
reality of American demography, with its composition drawing
people of different races, nationalities and religions, accentuated its
inherent diversity.
Brandeis regarded pluralism as not simply a fact, but as a
necessity. American society could only function if citizens interacted
- if they made an effort to know and understand each other. Society
must recognize not simply the rights of diverse people, but also the
duties each has in order to behave as democratic citizens. Citizens
must perform their duties in a pluralistic society so that differences

153

Id. at 195.
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could be expressed and resolved peacefully and so that public
decisions would reflect the views and wisdom of the collective body.
But diversity presented an opportunity as well as a challenge.
Brandeis believed that understanding, knowledge, growth, and
wisdom were more likely to come from exposure to difference than
to convention. Immigrants from different lands enriched America
and provided the opportunity to enhance America by contributing to
its culture. Citizens from different backgrounds could expand their
knowledge and understanding by reciprocal interaction.
Brandeis’ expansive conception of the duty of citizens in a
pluralistic society was evident in his work as a lawyer, his activity as
a public citizen, his deep commitment to Zionism, and his work as
one of the greatest justices on America’s Supreme Court. He gave
voice to a deeply entrenched American ideal that has endured, despite
occasional challenges. His work and words provide a continuous
beacon as against those who would free individuals from their social
responsibilities and against those in modern times and in all times
who would place walls in America between people of different races,
religions or nationalities.
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